


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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# WEEKLY SUMMARY

*Special Report*

*The Third Nonaligned Summit:*

*The Swan Song of Yugoslav Predominance*

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**CONFIDENTIAL****THE THIRD NONALIGNED SUMMIT: The Swan Song of Yugoslav Predominance**

The sound of the gavel in Lusaka on 6 September will mark the successful culmination of a two-year effort on the part of Yugoslav President Tito to restore interest in the moribund nonaligned movement. Whether or not Belgrade has been successful in breathing new life into the movement will not be known, however, until months—even years—after the gathering.

Because of the varying and often conflicting interests and views of the participants, the Lusaka summit may possibly be the last world-wide gathering of nonaligned nations. The fact that it is being held at all is a tribute to Tito's prestige and to the ability of Belgrade's Foreign Ministry to stimulate interest in a movement that two years ago was considered dead.

The first two days of the meeting will be devoted to consultation among the foreign ministers, at which time—hopefully—the thorny problem of whether or not to seat rival Cambodian and South Vietnamese delegations will be resolved. The foreign ministers are also expected to decide on whether to seat African liberation movement delegations. The heads of state will then meet on 8 September.

The Lusaka gathering, however, reveals nonalignment at a critical cross-road. The agenda is broad enough for all participants to accept, and undoubtedly a number of resolutions will be published—including a denunciation of the war in Indochina, support for the Palestinian cause, and condemnation of the remnants of colonialism in Africa. Considering Tito's age (78), he cannot be expected to hold nonalignment together much longer. Therefore, the challenge at Lusaka will be to lay the foundation for a nonalignment movement that can survive its most prestigious and foremost advocate.

*Tito's Role*

Nonalignment is the stepchild of the cold war. During the late 1940s and 1950s, the developing and newly independent nations considered themselves at the mercy of the superpowers. There arose a gradual recognition that the peoples of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America might have a common interest in promoting peaceful coexistence and in avoiding

an alliance with one or another of the superpowers. This led to the convening of the first nonaligned summit nearly ten years ago.

If it were not for Tito, it is safe to say there would be no nonaligned summit in Zambia. He alone of the four original supporters of nonalignment (Nehru of India and Sukarno of Indonesia—both deceased—and Nasir of the UAR) has given the movement momentum. Nonalignment began

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to take shape as far back as 1947 in the policy objectives and pronouncements of India's Prime Minister Nehru. In the early 1950s President Tito helped give the movement meaning. In the words of one student of nonalignment, "Tito, the Croatian metal worker, accomplished what Nehru, the Brahmin aristocrat, thought beyond reach—the vitalization of nonalignment."


Tito is the most traveled nonaligned leader, and his personal diplomacy has been a key to the movement's success. The first inkling of Tito's future role on behalf of the nonaligned cause came during his 1954 visit to India. In an address to the Indian Parliament, Tito called for active cooperation among states with different social systems "to remove all elements liable to impede a broad cooperation between states, large and small."

The concept of nonalignment was aided by the Bandung Conference of 29 Asian and African countries, held in Indonesia in April 1955 to promote peaceful coexistence. The Bandung gathering was strictly a regional conference, including representatives from some states that were clearly aligned. The decisions adopted, however, fitted Tito's own foreign policy objectives as much as if he had taken part in drafting them. The gathering strongly condemned colonialism,

advocated universality of membership in the United Nations, and called for disarmament as well as the prohibition of nuclear testing.

The first nonaligned summit was held in Belgrade in September 1961. Attended by 25 countries as full members, three countries as official observers, and 19 national liberation movements and Socialist labor splinter groups as unofficial observers, the summit adopted a program whose tenets have become standard nonaligned rhetoric—world disarmament, the closing of foreign military bases, a condemnation of imperialism, and the restoration of the rights of the Palestinians. In addition, the summit called attention to the needs of the developing nations and urged that Communist China be admitted to the UN.

The initial achievements of nonalignment were impressive. The various nations accelerated their move toward decolonization through lobbying efforts at the UN and in bilateral talks around the globe. Moreover, as a result of a united stand by the nonaligned countries, the UN Disarmament Committee was enlarged in 1962, and by their implicit rejection of Moscow's "troika" proposal for leadership of the UN when Dag Hammarskjold was killed in an airplane accident, they contributed to the solution of that crisis.



Participants at the first nonaligned summit, September 1961, in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

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Tito, Ben Bella, and Nasir in Cairo on the eve of the second nonaligned summit in October 1964.

The cohesion that marked the initial phase of nonalignment and promised so much, was, however, short lived.

By the time the second summit was held in Cairo in October 1964, the earlier harmony and unity were gone. Forty-seven nations were on hand as full members and ten as observers, but along with the increased number of participants, contradictory regional interests and rivalries flared. Indonesia's President Sukarno spearheaded a pro-Chinese, anti-imperialist, and anti-peaceful coexistence platform that nearly wrecked the meeting. Through the united efforts of Tito, India's Prime Minister Shastri, and Nasir, the conference was able to end on a positive note by condemning colonialism and stressing the economic needs of the third world.

The diversity of interests displayed at Cairo, the growing detente in East-West relations, as well as the end of most colonial rule in Africa took much of the punch out of nonalignment. In the succeeding years, the movement waned and appeared to be on the verge of extinction. A num-

ber of world events, however, convinced Tito that nonalignment should be revived and actively pursued. These included the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, the continuation of the war in Indochina, and the failure to resolve the Middle East crisis. Beginning in 1968, Yugoslavia renewed its activity in support of convening a third nonalignment summit.

Yugoslavia's call for a viable nonaligned movement brought hope to the third world by offering an alternative to leaning on either the East or West. Furthermore, Tito's message is based on the example of Belgrade's past successes as well as on an appeal to emerging governments as co-equals. Yugoslavia's problems are much the same as those of many third-world nations. Large parts of the country remain backward, and it is still struggling for national identity, internal cohesion, and political independence. In spite of all this, however, Belgrade has made great strides both economically and socially. Moreover, under Tito's leadership, Yugoslavia's neutrality toward the superpowers is backed up by its actions: Belgrade does business with both the East and West, but it maintains an independent foreign policy.

#### *Nonalignment and Yugoslavia*

Belgrade owes a great deal to nonalignment. Not only is it the vehicle by which Yugoslavia emerged from diplomatic isolation in the early fifties, but it has enabled Tito to play an active and far greater role in international politics than he otherwise could have managed. As a result, nonalignment gave Yugoslavia a source of pride and accomplishment no other policy could offer.

Belgrade, however, has offered the third world something more tangible than just the theory of nonalignment. Since the mid-1950s, it has extended slightly over \$900 million in credits and other assistance to some 40 less developed countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Almost all of the credits have been given to finance Yugoslav exports of capital equipment

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and for associated technical assistance. The largest recipients have been India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the UAR, and Iran. Included in the wide variety of complete projects financed are hydroelectric and thermal electric power stations, food processing plants, building-materials factories, textile plants, ships, port facilities, water-supply systems, and geological exploration.

Most recently, the Yugoslavs signed a two-year program of technical cooperation with the East African countries of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia. In connection with the summit itself, Belgrade is picking up the bill for the physical plant in Lusaka. The 60 "prestige" houses as well as the conference hall are being built with Yugoslav money and by Yugoslav technicians. Although the Yugoslav aid program does not depend directly on Western grants and credits, the large volume of such assistance to Yugoslavia has put it in a better position to continue its own economic aid program.

Backed up by the extension of credits, Belgrade's policy has called for a rising share of trade with the less developed countries, both to provide outlets for exports that cannot compete in Western markets and to acquire needed raw materials. The results of this policy have been far less than hoped. Many of the recipients of Yugoslav credits have been slow to draw upon them—only \$300 million had been drawn and an additional \$140 million definitely contracted for by the end of 1967. Moreover, difficulties in arranging mutually satisfactory exchanges of goods have led to a near stagnation of Yugoslavia's clearing trade with less developed countries in recent years. Trade turnover with this area last year accounted for only 9 percent of total Yugoslav trade compared with 11 percent in 1966.

The aid program itself is not without its critics and problems. A number of Yugoslav officials ask why Belgrade offers technical assistance to developing countries when large parts of Yugoslavia remain backward and woefully in need of assistance. Moreover, Belgrade's assistance has not

always been well planned or smoothly executed. Yugoslav businessmen have in the past committed themselves to projects they were totally unprepared to handle and have shown naivete in thinking that Yugoslav responsibility ended with the completion of the projects. As a result, the Yugoslavs have left finished plants and projects in the hands of totally unprepared and unqualified bureaucrats.

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These problems will not prevent the Yugoslavs from continuing their assistance program, however, inasmuch as it has enhanced their image and political influence in the third world. [redacted]

[redacted] "the Yugoslavs are the most appreciated whites in Africa—they are able, conscientious, and do not come as missionaries of a particular cause." Moreover, the Yugoslav brand of socialism holds some appeal for new nations. Not only is "socialism" a potent political word—rightly or wrongly conjuring up thoughts of social justice, economic improvement, and political democracy, but Yugoslavia's decentralized system of enterprise management holds a great deal of fascination for the third world. The UAR's Corporation Law, adopted in early 1966, may well reflect Yugoslavia's experience with autonomy for plant managers.

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Belgrade has given a great deal to nonalignment, but it has also taken much. Because of it, Yugoslav influence and prestige have grown out of proportion for a country its size. Psychologically at least, this has helped make it difficult for Moscow to bring overt pressure on Belgrade to rejoin the Communist bloc.

In Moscow's eyes, nonalignment has only compounded the sins of Yugoslavia's erring ways. The Soviets are well aware of the attraction Belgrade holds for the developing nations and view its nonaligned activity as working at cross purposes and undercutting Soviet influence. However, as long as nonalignment attacks colonialism and imperialism in terms acceptable to the Soviet Union, the Kremlin must tolerate it. The problem, as Moscow sees it, is that Yugoslavia takes its

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
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nonaligned neutrality seriously. It not only criticizes US involvement in South Vietnam but denounces the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, and insists that both the US and Soviet fleets withdraw from the Mediterranean in the interest of peace.

*The Lusaka Gathering*

Belgrade began preparing for the upcoming summit early in 1968 but did not succeed in mustering enough support for a preparatory conference until 1969. In July of that year, 51 nonaligned nations met in Belgrade in what was a well-managed and low-key affair, but they hesitated to call a summit.

The next step was a meeting of the foreign ministers of the nonaligned states in New York last September during the 24th UN General Assembly session. It was then decided to proceed with plans for a summit, and a second preparatory conference was set for this April in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.



Tito and wife on arrival in Tanzania last February as Yugoslavia's charismatic president continued his drive to drum up support for nonalignment.

Before the Dar es Salaam gathering, however, Tito began to use the power of his personal diplomacy to gain support for the summit. In late January and February he toured eight east African nations, praising the merits of nonalignment at every stop. Tito's tour was paralleled by that of Dimce Belovski (head of the Yugoslav mass organization SWAPY) through seven west



President of the Revolutionary Command Council of Sudan, Jaafar Numayri, welcoming President Tito to Khartoum last February.

African nations, and by Foreign Minister Tepavac's excursion to southeast Asia in March.

Tito's tactic apparently worked. The meeting in Tanzania was attended by 51 countries and, to the surprise of many, proceeded swiftly and efficiently, side-stepping potential pitfalls and postponing settlement of the Cambodian and South Vietnamese representation problem until the summit itself.

In all, approximately 74 nations have been approached on attending the meeting in Lusaka, and the latest count indicates 45 will be represented. An anticipated additional 17 would raise this total to 62. Among the government heads committed to attend are Tito, India's Prime Minister Gandhi, and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. Representatives of most of the African national liberation movements are expected to be on hand, as are delegates from the Palestinian Liberation Movement.

The motives of those attending the Lusaka gathering are as varied as are the participants. For Cairo, as well as most of the Arab world, the

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DELEGATIONS EXPECTED TO ATTEND THE NONALIGNED SUMMIT

| <u>Country</u>              | <u>Position on<br/>Cambodia</u> | <u>Heading Delegation</u>                |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| Afghanistan                 |                                 | Premier Nur Ahmad Etemadi                |
| Algeria                     | S                               | Foreign Minister Bouteflika              |
| Botswana                    | L                               | President Seretse Khama                  |
| Burundi                     |                                 | President Micombero                      |
| Cameroon                    |                                 | Vice President Muna                      |
| Central African<br>Republic |                                 |                                          |
| Ceylon                      | S                               | President Bokassa                        |
| Chad                        |                                 | Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike         |
| Congo (B)                   |                                 | President Tombalbaye                     |
| Congo (K)                   | L                               | President Mobutu                         |
| Cuba                        | S                               |                                          |
| Cyprus                      | N                               | President Makarios                       |
| Ethiopia                    |                                 | Emperor Haile Selassie                   |
| Equatorial Guinea           |                                 | President Macias                         |
| Ghana                       | N                               | Prime Minister Kofi Busia                |
| Guinea                      | S                               | President of National Assembly Leon Maka |
| Guyana                      |                                 | Prime Minister Burnham                   |
| India                       | N                               | Prime Minister Gandhi                    |
| Indonesia                   | L                               | President Suharto                        |
| Iraq                        |                                 | Vice President Hardan Abd al-Ghaffar     |
| Kenya                       |                                 | Vice President Moi                       |
| Laos                        | L                               | Prince Souvanna                          |
| Lenanon                     |                                 | Foreign Minister Majdalani               |
| Liberia                     | L                               | Vice President Tolbert                   |
| Malaysia                    | L                               | Deputy Prime Minister Razak              |
| Mali                        | N                               | Foreign Minister Sory Coulibaly          |
| Mauritania                  | S                               | President Ould Daddah                    |
| Morocco                     |                                 | Foreign Minister Abdelhadi Boutaleb      |
| Nepal                       |                                 | King Mahendra                            |
| Rwanda                      | L                               | Foreign Minister Sylvester Nsanzimana    |
| Senegal                     | Both                            | Foreign Minister Gueye                   |
| Sierra Leone                | N                               | Prime Minister Stevens                   |
| Singapore                   | L                               | Premier Lee Kwan Yew                     |
| Somalia                     | S                               | Foreign Minister Omar Arteh              |
| Sudan                       | S                               | President Numa,ri                        |
| Swaziland                   |                                 | Prime Minister Dhlamini                  |
| Tanzania                    | S                               | President Nyerere                        |
| Tunisia                     |                                 |                                          |
| UAR                         | S                               | Foreign Minister Riad                    |
| Uganda                      |                                 | President Milton Obote                   |
| Yugoslavia                  | S                               | President Tito                           |
| Zambia                      |                                 | President Kaunda                         |

S = Sihanouk

L = Lon Nol

N = Neither Cambodian Representative

Also expected to attend as official or unofficial observers are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Gambia, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Malawi, Peru, Jamaica, Somalia, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, the Vatican, Colombia, the Yemen Arab Republic, Turkey and Venezuela.

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| <b>AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS<br/>LIKELY TO PARTICIPATE AT THE SUMMIT*</b> |                                                                        |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| African National Congress<br>(ANG or SAANG)                                  | Popular Movement for the<br>Liberation of Angola (MPLA)                |
| South West African People's<br>Organization (SWAPO)                          | Zimbabwe African National Union<br>(ZANU)                              |
| Mozambique Liberation Front<br>(FRELIMO)                                     | Zimbabwe African Peoples Union<br>(ZAPU)                               |
| Mozambique Revolutionary<br>Committee (COREMO)                               | African Party for the Independence<br>of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAGIC) |

\*All have offices in Lusaka except PAGIC

Lusaka summit marks a return to overt support for nonalignment. Obviously the Arabs hope to gain support for their cause against Israel. It also provides them with a convenient forum from which to gain a strong endorsement of the rights of the Palestinians. Nasir, originally a major supporter of the movement, has had little time to devote to nonalignment since the June 1967 war, and he only returned to the fold after meeting with Tito last February at Aswan.

India, by virtue of its historical role in non-alignment, is committed to attend. New Delhi, however, even before Nehru's death, had begun changing its concept of nonalignment. Although its basic principle—avoiding commitments to any great-power alliance system—has been maintained, Indian interest in association with a nonaligned bloc has waned, and the country's interests are now concentrated on South Asia. It is going to Lusaka with a view toward protecting its own particular interests and to see what benefits there may be for it in refurbishing its fading image as a leader of the nonaligned nations.

For Indonesia, Asia's other giant neutral, the summit at first held out prospects of reasserting its international posture after several years of preoccupation with domestic policy following Sukarno's ouster. The overthrow of Cambodian Prince Sihanouk and Djakarta's strong support for Lon Nol has—to many who will be gathered at Lusaka—undercut Indonesia's credentials as a nonaligned nation.

The Black African states take a particular pride in the summit because it is being held in Zambia. The attitudes of the various countries concerning the merits of nonalignment vary, but there is a general consensus that with Lusaka as host, the entire region has gained new prestige. Economic cooperation will be foremost in the minds of many Africans attending. Furthermore, for a few short days the world will be focusing on an international conference in which they will play a vital role. The Black African states, therefore, have a vested interest in the success of the conference and will work toward this end.

Some 12 Latin American countries may be in Lusaka. Each has its own reason for attending, but all view their presence as a means of self-expression. As the nations of Latin America move away from the United States politically, nonalignment becomes more attractive. Most of them are leery of both the USSR and the US, and therefore are willing to explore nonalignment as an alternative.

#### *The Agenda*

In an effort to avoid the friction and tension that marred the Cairo summit, a broad, clearly defined agenda has been drafted for the Lusaka gathering. The major points for discussion will be: 1) a general review of the international situation; 2) the democratization of international relations as well as the safeguarding and strengthening of peace, freedom, development, and cooperation; 3) the safeguarding of national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and equality among states—including support for liberation movements and a strong anticolonial stance; and 4) the economic development and self-reliance of the nonaligned states.

More narrowly defined issues will include a strong restatement of support for the rights of the Palestinian Arabs. Portuguese, Rhodesian, and South African policies toward the blacks will come under strong attack as will Britain's decision to resume limited arms sales to South Africa. There also may be some movement toward

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developing a program of closer economic and technical cooperation between the nonaligned states with an emphasis on self-reliance. In addition, support for Communist China's admittance to the United Nations is anticipated.

The summit is expected to praise the first 25 years of the United Nations. Moreover, a special resolution calling for the strengthening of that organization (to be presented at the 25th UN General Assembly jubilee session) will be drafted. Among other things, the resolution is scheduled to call for the implementation of the 1960 UN Declarations on Decolonization, a statement of respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, the formulation of an international development strategy for the 1970s, a proclamation to make the 1970s the "Decade of Disarmament," and a "Declaration for Peace, Freedom, Development, and Democratization of International Relations."

A number of problems will have to be dealt with, however, if the gathering is to be a success. First and foremost is the question of seating the rival Cambodian delegations. The preparatory meetings simply avoided the issue by referring it to the summit. At the moment neither the Sihanouk nor the Lon Nol representatives appear to have enough support to win a seat, and a large number of prospective participants are in favor of recognizing neither. Many of those going to Lusaka who might otherwise favor seating Sihanouk or his group are concerned about the danger of setting a precedent in recognizing a government in exile.

Despite rumors to the contrary, there is no evidence that Sihanouk intends to put in a personal appearance at Lusaka. The possibility, however, cannot be ruled out. Just what the impact of his presence would mean is difficult to say, but Lon Nol supporters are concerned that it could start a stampede on Sihanouk's behalf that would end in the seating of his government.

For its part, the Lon Nol regime is actively lobbying for admission at Lusaka. Two delega-

tions have been dispatched to Africa to present the Cambodian Government's case for a seat at the summit. The effort appears to be in vain, and best indications are that few, if any, converts will be made. All Lon Nol can realistically hope for is that these governments will abstain on the Cambodian question. At the moment, a quick count of the delegates committed to Lusaka indicates Lon Nol simply does not have enough support to gain a seat. The best bet now is that the issue will die in committee.

Also touchy is the problem of seating the Communist Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. As in the case of the Sihanouk delegation, a large number of those countries planning to attend the conference are wary of setting a controversial precedent. Furthermore, a great many of the delegates maintain ties with Saigon, and the seating of the Viet Cong could cause the conference to break down by making it impossible for nations such as Indonesia to continue its participation. It is unlikely, therefore, that any South Vietnamese delegation will be seated.

#### *Beyond the Summit*

The Lusaka summit will probably end on a positive note, with the nonaligned nations successfully drafting a program to present to the UN jubilee session in October. The final results, however, will undoubtedly reflect the lowest common denominator upon which the participants can agree. Just as in Cairo in 1964, this will mean heavy emphasis on the broadest possible issues and a de-emphasis of specific problems.

A major question for this meeting, however, is the future of nonalignment itself. As it was conceived and practiced in the late 1950s and early 1960s, nonalignment is no longer applicable to today's world in a meaningful way. It has limitations, and even Tito recognizes that his once-cherished dream of a large, cohesive bloc of nonaligned states dramatically influencing the course of world events has not borne fruit. If nonalignment is to survive and play a role in

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world affairs, it obviously will have to undergo some basic changes.

One possibility is to organize along regional lines. Most recently, the Ugandan Foreign Minister, Sam Odaka, has suggested that future co-operation follow the example of the East African community—a loose organization providing a number of common services for and economic cooperation between Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda.

The Lusaka summit could also be the end of Yugoslav predominance in the nonaligned movement. From the beginning, this has been Tito's pet project; the rest of the Yugoslav leaders are somewhat less enthusiastic, although they are nearly unanimous in recognizing the merits of the movement. Tito's years at the helm in Belgrade are numbered, and whoever follows him is unlikely to have the qualifications or the drive to lead nonalignment. Moreover, most Yugoslav leaders are looking for more immediate and more relevant returns.

Furthermore, Yugoslavia itself has changed drastically. Belgrade now feels its security and future lie in a loose association with the West, and it is actively and successfully cultivating a wide range of political and economic contacts in Western Europe—including a recent and significant agreement with the Common Market. Although the new generation of Yugoslav leaders will undoubtedly continue to cultivate Belgrade's political and economic ties in the third world, nonalignment will no longer hold center stage in its foreign policy.

The real challenge for the delegates gathered at Lusaka will be to lay the foundation for a movement that can transcend Tito's personality and survive with a smaller Yugoslav commitment. Chances are that neither Nasir, Mrs. Gandhi, nor Suharto has the time or interest to lend prestige to such an endeavor. If a new moving spirit is to appear, it will probably come from among one of the better developed but smaller states that profess nonalignment as a policy.

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